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Commentary on Szmukler: 
Mental Illness, .Dangerousness, 
and Involuntary Civil 
Commitment 
Ken Levy and Alex Cohen 
1. Introduction 
Dr. George Szmukler has written a very thought-provoking and enlightening chapter. 
After distinguishing among five different levels of "treatment pressures" - persuasion, 
interpersonal leverage, inducements/offers, threats, and compulsion (seep. 127) - Dr. 
Szrnukler focuses mostly on the last of these. In both the United Kingdom and the 
United States, an individual cannot be compelled to receive "involuntary outpatient 
treatment" (IOT) 1 or be committed to a hospital unless she satisfies three criteria: 
(a) she is deemed by the authorities to constitute a danger to herself or others or 
(b) she is dangerous to others (c) because of a mental illness (seep. 130-31).2 Most of 
Dr. Szmukler's paper is concerned with (c). He argues, in line with the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (see pp. 141-42), that 
it is both unnecessary and "unfairly discriminatory"; that the idea that compulsory 
treatment or commitment requires mental illness rests on the popular myth that there is 
a significant correlation between mental illness and dangerousness (see p. 132-34). 
The solution that Dr. Szmukler proposes is to replace the mental-illness criterion 
with two tests: one to determine if an individual is suffering from an impairment of 
"decision-making capability" (DMC) and the other to determine if a given treatment 
is in the patient's best interests (BI). As compared with current application of the 
mental-illness criterion, Dr. Szmukler argues, application of DMC and BI would help 
to minimize the risk of stigma and unfair discrimination and promote greater respect 
for patients' decisions, preferences, values, and autonomy (see pp. 131, 134, 137-41). 
Dr. Szmukler's position regarding the mental-illness criterion advances a debate 
that has been raging in the literature for the last five decades concerning the tension 
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between individual rights and involuntary commitment for individuals with putative 
mental illness. We appreciate Dr. Szmukler's clear concern for patients and for their 
rights, reputations, and general well-being; we agree with his thesis that involuntary 
treatment is not always the optimal approach; and we are sympathetic to his proposal 
that we reconsider the conditions triggering involuntary civil commitment. We do, 
however, take issue with Dr. Szmukler's treatment of the dangerousness criterion. 
Dr. Szmukler does not really make clear what role it should play. He does suggest 
that non- or pre-criminal dangerousness "could be covered by the BI requirement" 
and suggests that if treatment either does not eliminate the danger of violence or is 
refused by an individual with impaired DMC, then "recourse to the criminal justice 
system would be necessary" (see p. 135). But this is all a little too quick; recourse to 
the criminal justice system is often unwarranted if the individual merely poses a 
danger to herself or others and has not (yet) committed any crime. What, then, 
should \Ve do in these situations? 
We will attempt to answer this question in section 3. (The preceding section, 
section 2, will explicate the different purposes of criminal punishment and of invo-
luntary civil commitment.) In sections 4 and 5, \Ve will discuss different approaches to 
the definition of mental illness and offer further reasons in support of Dr. Szmukler's 
skepticism about the mental-illness requirement. And in section 6, we \vill offer some 
final thoughts about the causal epistemology of mental illness. The reader should 
note that we are writing about involuntary commitment from an American perspec-
tive. So there will be some nuanced differences between our approach and that of 
Dr. Szmukler, who is writing from a more British perspective. 
2. Constitutional Limits on Individual Freedom: Criminal 
Punishment and Involuntary Civil Commitment 
Involuntary civil commitment, which we consider to be a necessary evil, is a depri-
vation of liberty for the purpose of protecting either the patient from self-destructive 
behavior or society from the patient. Because Western societies greatly value individual 
liberty, there must be a rigorous test for imposing this deprivation. In order to 
determine whether a given individual poses a danger to herself or others, at least one 
qualified expert must apply this test, and both the content and application of this test 
must be consistent with the individual's constitutional rights-specifically, with the 
5th Amendment ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law ... ") and the 14th Amendment ("[N]or shall any state 
deprive any person oflife, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw ... ").3 
This last point bears emphasis. Few would argue that arrest following probable cause 
or imprisonment following a criminal conviction is unconstitutional. Of course, she may 
argue that a particular arrest or conviction is constitutionally invalid. But arrest and 
imprisonment in and of themselves are perfectly consistent with the Constitution, despite 
the premium that the Constitution places on individual liberty. And the reason for this 
consistency is that constitutional rights are not absolute. There are several reasons. 
First, as George Washington stated in the cover letter transmitting the Constitution to 
the Congress: "Individuals entering into society must give up a share of liberty to 
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preserve the rest. "4 In other words, individual liberty must be restricted to make 
society and social harmony possible. Second, the Constitution permits further 
restrictions of the right to liberty under certain circumstances. These circumstances 
include arrest, conviction, curfew, and military draft. 
Whether the Constitution permits restrictions of the right to liberty under another 
circumstance--namely, the determination that a given individual poses a danger to 
herself or others-is less clear. The patient may have done nothing wrong, certainly 
nothing that warrants arrest or conviction. Yet involuntary civil commitment 
involves treating the patient in a manner that superficially resembles incarceration. 
Just like the criminal offender, the patient is "locked up" against her will. How, then, 
can we justify treating the patient like an offender? Isn't this an obvious violation of 
her constitutional due process rights? In a word: no. The reasons justifying invo-
luntarily committing an individual outweigh her constitutional right to liberty. To 
understand what these reasons are, we first need to understand the reasons why we 
imprison convicted off enders. 
The first reason that we imprison offenders is "consequentialist": to bring about 
good consequences. The main consequentialist goal of incarceration is to protect 
society from further crime. Incarceration contributes to this goal in three different 
ways. First, incarceration incapacitates; it protects society (at least society outside 
prison)5 from the person who is incarcerated. Second, specific deterrence and reha-
bilitation: criminal punishment is designed to discourage the recipients of this punishment 
from committing further crimes if and when they return to society. Third, general 
deterrence: criminal punishment is designed to discourage all other similarly situated 
individuals from committing the same kinds of crime. Both kinds of deterrence, 
specific and general, presuppose that convicted criminals and most similarly situated 
individuals are rational (enough) actors who can weigh the risk of punishment for 
committing (further) crimes against the benefit of avoiding punishment, decide that 
the latter is more conducive to their well-being, and then act on this decision by 
choosing to comply with the law rather than violating it. 
The second reason that we lock up offenders is "retributivist": to give offenders 
what they deserve. This second reason intersects with the first (consequentialism) 
insofar as they both rest on the premise that the convicted offender was responsible 
for her criminal act. Retributivists assume that responsibility is necessary for Gust) 
punishment because, "\vithout it, the person would not desewe punishment in the first place. 
Likewise, consequentialists generally assume that responsibility is necessary for pun-
ishment but for a different reason: (a) punishment cannot deter criminal activity 
unless the people whom the punishment is designed to deter can be motivated by the 
threat of punishment, and (b) this kind of motivation requires threshold levels of 
control and rationality, both of which are arguably sufficient for responsibility. 
The third reason is "expressivist": to communicate both to offenders and to the 
rest of society that the kind of behavior for which they are being punished is unac-
ceptable. On this view, punishment is a kind oflanguage that is used to communicate 
disapproval and impose stigma. One might argue that expressivism reduces to con-
sequentialism because (a) communication is itself a consequence, and (b) it is desired 
as a means to further consequences (such as deterrence). But at least with regard to 
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(b), the expressivist may maintain that communication is intended not merely as a 
means to the end of deterrence but also as an end in itsel£ On this view, it is 
intrinsically, not just instrumentally, valuable for a community to speak its mind 
about criminal transgressions. 
When it comes to cases of involuntary civil commitment that do not involve a 
crime being committed, the retributivist and expressivist justifications for criminal 
punishment simply do not apply. Once again, we involuntarily commit certain indi-
viduals for the very consequentialist reason of protecting either patients themselves or 
others from the patients. This is not specific deterrence because we assume that the 
patients suffer from serious cognitive, behavioral, and functional deficits and therefore 
cannot conduct, and then act upon, a rational risk/benefit analysis. Instead of hoping 
that we can influence them by incentivizing them to act rationally (through the 
threat of punishment), we need to directly control them. Nor does involuntary civil 
commitment involve general deterrence. We cannot hope to discourage similarly 
situated individuals from engaging in self-destructive or other-destructive behavior 
because similarly situated individuals are equally non-responsible and therefore equally 
immune to rational incentivization. Put very crudely, patients who are involuntarily 
committed are not "bad," a term that connotes responsible wrongdoing, but "mad," 
a term that connotes an inability to think or act rationally. As a result, we cannot 
appeal to their reason. Instead, we must resort to sheer brute force. 
3. Should We Treat Homicide as a Public Health Threat? 
Given the presumption of liberty that the Constitution guarantees to every citizen, 
there are three main reasons why this presumption will sometimes be overridden: 
arrest, criminal conviction, and involuntary civil commitment. For the remainder of 
this reply, we will concentrate on involuntary civil commitment. Involuntary civil 
commitment is authorized if and only if the individual either: (a) carries, or is rea-
sonably expected to carry, a dangerous and infectious disease;6 (b) is dangerous to 
herself; or (c) is dangerous to others because she is mentally ill.7 
Consider (a).8 Both the federal and state governments have the power to isolate 
and quarantine individuals whom they reasonably suspect carry a communicable disease.9 
The primary rationale for this power is to prevent the spread of the disease and 
thereby protect other members of society. The secondary rationale is to treat the 
individual herself 
Interestingly, while presenting a threat to the public is sufficient justification for 
involuntary commitment (isolation or quarantine) when the source of the threat is 
(suspected) infectious disease, presenting a threat to the public is not sufficient justifi-
cation for involuntary commitment when the source of the threat is the person's 
disposition to homicide. In the latter situation, as we noted in the Introduction, two 
other conditions must also be satisfied: the person must be mentally ill, and the person's 
homicidal disposition must be attributable to this mental illness.10 
Why are these two additional criteria required? Why aren't threats of homicide 
considered to be, and treated just like, public-health threats? Isn't, for example, a 
person's statement that he will kill others just as dangerous as a person's carrying of an 
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infectious disease? And if it is just as dangerous, why isn't a disposition to murder 
sufficient for civil commitment? Why must mental illness and a causal relationship 
also be satisfied? 
There are three main reasons. First, the scale of the threat posed by homicide is far 
less than the scale of the threat posed by an infectious disease. While the most "suc-
cessful" serial killers in history have killed hundreds of people, some diseases can easily 
kill thousands to millions. So as a matter of public policy, if the State wishes to 
minimize premature deaths, it should make sure to focus much more of its efforts on 
quarantining dangerous-disease carriers than it does on ferreting out and committing 
likely murderers. Indeed, as a public-policy priority, homicide prevention should lose 
out to suicide prevention as well. Despite what the media would lead us to believe, 
suicides happen to occur much more frequently than homicides. 11 
Second, the chance that a disease ·will spread if a host remains in the population is 
much higher than the chance that a given individual will act on her homicidal 
intentions or threats. If a person carries a highly infectious disease, the chance that she 
\Vill spread this disease (if left free) is nearly 100 percent. If, however, a person is 
considered homicidal but not mentally ill, the chance that she will attempt to commit 
homicide is considered to be much lower-certainly not 100 percent. 
Third, while isolation and quarantine are sometimes the only measures that society 
can implement to stop the spread of certain diseases, methods other than involuntary 
commitment such as anger management, restraining orders, threats of criminal 
punishment, and rational dissuasion can be used to "talk down" a would-be killer. 
All of this is not meant to suggest that homicidal threats should not be taken ser-
iously or that temporary detainment is not often appropriate to prevent these threats 
from being executed. It is only to say that the mere threat of homicide is not 
equivalent in scale, probabilities, or preventability to the dangers presented by com-
munication of an infectious disease and therefore does not necessarily warrant the 
same kind of preventive response (i.e., involuntary commitment). 
4. Defining Mental Illness: Medical vs. Legal Perspectives 
The American Psychiatric Association published the Fifth Edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) in 2013. The DSM-5 is rather 
umvieldy. It is approximately 1,000 pages long and lists over 300 kinds of mental 
disorders. These 300+ mental disorders are placed into 21 separate categories running 
the gamut of severity-from relatively minor disorders such as adjustment disorders 
to relatively severe disorders such as those involving dementia, psychosis, and 
neurodegenerative diseases. 
DSM-5 offers one of the two major taxonomies of mental disorders. The other is 
the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10), which is published by the 
World Health Organization. Because the DSM-5 and ICD-10 are so complicated, 
experts are needed to understand and apply them. As the DSM-5 states, "It requires 
clinical training to recognize when the combination of predisposing, precipitating, 
perpetuating, and protective factors has resulted in a psychopathological condition in 
which physical signs and symptoms exceed normal ranges" 12 (see also Szmukler, 
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p. 141). Similarly, DSM-5 later states, "Use of DSM-5 to assess for the presence of a 
mental disorder by nonclinical, nonmedical, or otherwise insufficiently trained individuals 
is not advised."13 
The DSM-5 defines mental disorder as follows: 
A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance 
in an individual's cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a dys-
function in the psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying 
mental functioning. Mental disorders are usually associated \vith significant distress 
in social, occupational, or other important activities. An expectable or culturally 
approved response to a common stressor or loss, such as the death of a loved one, 
is not a mental disorder. Socially deviant behavior (e.g., political, religious, or sexual) 
and conflicts that are primarily between the individual and society are not mental 
disorders unless the deviance or conflict results from a dysfunction in the individual.14 
At least two terms in this definition are necessarily vague: significant (twice) and dysfimction 
(twice). So are some exceptions to this definition: "[s]ocially deviant behavior (e.g., 
political, religious, or sexual) and conflicts that are primarily between the individual 
and society" that are not the results of "a dysfunction in the individual." 
Legal definitions of mental illness are quite different from the ones found in DSM-5 
or ICD-10. While psychiatrists and psychologists must consider over 300 kinds of 
mental illnesses spanning the entire thousand-page DSM-5, law tends to focus only 
on that narrow part of the mental-illness spectrum that correlates with criminal 
activity or undermines consent. For example, Ohio's criminal code defines mental 
illness as a "substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation or memory 
that grossly impairs judgement, behavior, capacity to recognize reality or ability to 
meet the ordinary demands of life."15 Importantly, the vast majority of mental ill-
nesses in the DSM-5 fall short of this legal definition. Few of them either involve 
substantial impairment of judgment, of behavior, or of other domains of functioning 
or are associated with violent (or suicidal) behavior. Individuals diagnosed with, for 
example, a learning disability or an adjustment disorder are not necessarily likely to 
engage in dangerous behavior. 
5. Why is Mental Illness Required for Involuntary Commitment? 
Consider two scenarios. In "Suicidal Scenario," Suicidal Sam announces to his co-workers 
Connie and Clarence that he will hang himself after the close of business. When they 
laugh uncomfortably, he shows them a rope \vith a noose, tells them that he is quite 
serious, and asks them to make sure that he is cremated rather than buried. In 
"Homicidal Scenario," Homicidal Harry announces to the same co-workers, Connie 
and Clarence, that he is going to kill his superiors at a meeting the next morning. 
When they laugh uncomfortably, he shows them the loaded pistol that he legally 
purchased a week ago and the hole-riddled targets that he shot up at the local firing 
range. Both Suicidal Scenario and Homicidal Scenario are paradigmatic examples of 
danger to self and danger to others respectively. 
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The mere fact that Suicidal Sam threatened to commit suicide is not necessarily 
sufficient to warrant the conclusion that he suffers from mental illness. The notion 
that nobody "in her right mind" would prefer to die rather than to live is false. First, 
some individuals wish to die because they are terminally ill and suffering great 
physical pain. Their desire to die on their own terms and thereby minimize not only 
their own but also their family's suffering is arguably quite rational. It is for this reason 
that the State may not force such individuals to receive life-saving medical treat-
ment.16 Second, some individuals who have just suffered great trauma-for example, 
losing a loved one, accidentally injuring or killing another person, or being accused 
or convicted of a serious crime-might be suicidal. Depending on the circumstances, 
their wanting to die in order to relieve themselves of great psychic pain (e.g., grief, 
guilt, or shame) may be rational enough that a diagnosis of mental illness would be 
inaccurate. 17 
For our purposes, however, assume that Suicidal Sam does not fit into either 
(rational) category. That is, he is suicidal not because he is terminally ill or because he 
just suffered great trauma but for a reason that society would consider irrational-that 
is, not strong enough to warrant a desire to die. (For example, Suicidal Sam is seriously 
distraught after his girlfriend broke up with him.) Suicidal Sam, then, probably qua-
lifies as mentally ill. The question remains, however, why it matters whether or not 
Suicidal Sam is mentally ill. The fact that he is irrationally suicidal should be sufficient 
reason for conviction. Whether his suicidal impulses arise from mental illness or from 
something else-for example, nihilism or grief-should not matter. Suicide is suicide; 
it is such a tragic event that if the State has an opportunity to prevent it from 
occurring through involuntary commitment, it should. be authorized to exercise this 
opportunity-again, whether or not the individual is mentally ill. 18 
Homicidal Harry's situation is more difficult for the State. 19 He has a better chance 
of remaining free than does Suicidal Sam. Of course, the police may detain Homi-
cidal Harry; ask him questions; and obtain a search warrant to search his person, 
office, home, and car. But if they cannot find any incriminating evidence-that is, 
evidence sufficient to warrant probable cause that Homicidal Harry has committed a 
crime-they cannot arrest him. The best that they can do is give him a stem warning, 
impose a restraining order on him (protecting his superiors), and then release him. 
This conclusion, however, assumes two things: (a) that Homicidal Harry's purchase of 
a weapon, target practice, and stated intent of committing homicide do not, 
all together, qualify as attempted murder; and (b) that Homicidal Harry is not in 
one of the few jurisdictions that criminalize communications of intended violence 
against others even when the intended targets are not the recipients of these 
communications. 20 
Of course, the State may compel Homicidal Harry to undergo a psychological 
evaluation. And if the evaluation results in a determination that Homicidal Harry is 
mentally ill, then-given the danger that he poses to others-he may be involuntarily 
committed. But if the evaluation does not result in this determination, then-once 
again-the State's hands are tied; they must release him. And in contrast to Suicidal 
Sam, whose irrational suicidal intent is generally considered to be presumptive, if not 
dispositive, evidence of mental illness (e.g., clinical depression), Homicidal Harry's 
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homicidal intent will not necessarily lead to the same conclusion. This is a curious 
asymmetry that probably stems from the notion that while suicide is generally fun-
damentally irrational, homicidal behavior is (much) more "natural" and "normal." As it 
turns out, this assumption may just be correct. There is a weaker correlation between 
mental illness and homicide than there is between mental illness and suicide.21 The 
fact of the matter is that many more or less mentally stable people kill. Examples 
include domestic violence, bar fights, drug-turf battles, and drunk driving. Still, even 
if many "normal" people kill, certain kinds of abnormality heighten the probability of 
killing. The "risk of violence is three-fold among those with psychosis" and the pre-
dictors of violence include "acute psychiatric symptoms" (such as mania, depression, 
delusions, hallucinations, and violent fantasies), Antisocial Personality Disorder, and 
psychopathy (see Szmukler, pp. 133-34).22 
One might very well argue that that the State should have the power to commit 
Homicidal Harry whether or not he is deemed mentally ill. The reason is that, even if 
he is not mentally ill, Homicidal Harry is very dangerous. He will likely kill at least 
one person and the person(s) he will kill presumably do(es) not wish to die. 
We can think of four reasons why involuntarily committing Homicidal Harry 
requires him to be not merely dangerous but also mentally ill. First, the weakest 
reason: It might be thought that some sort of symmetry with the criminal justice 
system must be maintained. The idea is that if a criminal conviction roughly requires 
dangerousness (in the form of commission of a crime) and responsibility, then involuntary 
commitment requires dangerousness and non-responsibility. And non-responsibility 
just is, or is caused by, mental illness. But this hypothesis is problematic. Aside from 
the fact that not all crimes are necessarily dangerous (e.g., drug possession and 
perjury), it is not clear why there must be this symmetry with the criminal justice 
system in the first place. If a person makes clear that she poses a serious threat to 
others, then it should not matter whether this threatening disposition arises from 
mental illness or from some other cause. The threat is sufficient reason to commit 
her, and she should be released from commitment only after authorities determine 
that the threat has fully passed. 
Second, mental illness is thought by some to increase the risk that Homicidal 
Harry will lose control or engage more readily in aggressive behavior. The problem 
with this hypothesis is that Homicidal Harry has already clearly exhibited homicidal 
intentions and (therefore) presents a serious enough risk that he will translate these 
intentions into action. So whether or not Homicidal Harry is mentally ill, the danger 
to others is quite real. Still, one might argue that if a person has demonstrated an 
inclination toward violence that is more ambiguous than Homicidal Harry's, then we 
may not conclude that this person poses a threat to others unless she suffers from a 
mental illness (such as schizophrenia or psychosis) that increases the risk that this 
inclination will be realized. For this reason, mental illness is required for involuntary 
commitment. We believe that this argument is credible but leads to two undesirable 
consequences: (a) it rules out commitment of individuals who pose a clear and serious 
threat but are not mentally ill; and (b) by requiring mental illness, we perpetuate 
the myths that mental illness generally causes dangerousness and that dangerousness is 
generally caused by mental illness. 
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Third, it has been argued that if dangerousness alone were required, the State would 
too often be accused of labeling certain people as dangerous for ulterior reasons-not 
because they really are dangerous but because they are perceived as political opponents 
or threats whom the State wishes to silence and intimidate. By requiring mental illness 
as well, the State avoids this appearance of false pretext and creates the much more 
salutary impression that its sole reason for committing certain people is their own, and 
others', welfare. 
Founh, mental illness may be required in addition to dangerousness less from 
principle than from lack of resources. In a personal communication (dated August 31, 
2014) to one of the authors, Ed Richards, Clarence W. Edwards Professor of Law 
and Director of the Program in Law, Science, and Public Health at LSU Law Center, 
put it this way: 
After the deinstitutionalization movement, there are relatively few places to lock 
people up. There are lots of private beds for voluntary commitment (if you have 
insurance) but not even a lot of private beds for involuntary commitment. They 
do not want actually dangerous patients, and the state does not want to pay the 
costs of private facilities. . . . Involuntary outpatient treatment has been the 
answer ... It is much less resource intensive. You do not need a facility. 23 
6. Conclusion: The Causal Epistemology Of Mental Illness 
Unlike many complementary domains of medicine (e.g., virology), the causal 
mechanisms underlying mental illnesses are almost completely unknown. The little we 
know is that each of them is caused by a complicated interplay of genetic, neurobiological, 
and environmental factors. There are two reasons why we know so little. 
First, there is no known genetic marker, neural signature, behavioral anomaly, or 
abnormal neuroanatomical structure that occurs in all, or often even most, patients 
with a specific mental illness. For example, only some individuals with schizophrenia 
suffer from gross impairments in reality testing. Moreover, symptoms of mental illness 
wax and wane over time. As a result, an individual diagnosed with schizophrenia may 
show impaired reality testing at one time, or in one context, but not another. 
Second, many of the symptoms associated with one particular mental illness are 
associated with other mental illnesses as well. For example, not only patients with 
schizophrenia but also patients with bipolar disorder and major depressive disorder 
suffer from gross impairments in reality testing. 
Our etiological ignorance has fueled the development of new diagnostic approa-
ches. Foremost among these is the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) initiative that 
was undertaken by the National Institute of Mental Health, the world's largest 
funding agency for research in mental illness. The RDoC initiative is an attempt to 
(a) construct a "periodic table" of mental illness demarcating isolated domains of 
psychopathology; and (b) elucidate the genetic, biological, and environmental 
mechanisms that cause these domains to malfunction. While still in the initial stages, 
the RDoC initiative has already produced results. For example, measures of emotion 
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derived from automated acoustic analysis of natural speech are helping to predict 
episodes of anger and hostility and therefore will likely be useful in predicting indi-
viduals' risks of acting out.24 Given its early successes and ambitious agenda, we are 
optimistic that RDoC will help us to discover other objective markers of mental ill-
ness; the biological processes underlying them; and new measures of, and treatments 
for, mental illness. 
Still, it is important to realize that RDoC and related efforts are only in their 
infancy. In order for an RD~C approach to be applicable to civil commitment, the 
very definitions of consent, reality testing, suicidality, homicidality, and related con-
structs will need to be reduced to their most basic elements before they can be 
empirically evaluated and objective, reliable, and valid forensic measures of these 
elements can be developed. But all of this is much easier said than done. Reality 
testing and dangerousness to self or others are very difficult to deconstruct largely 
because the neural mechanisms that cause them are quite varied and differ both across 
individuals and within the same individuals across time. For example, impairments in 
reality testing can reflect dysfunctions in a range of basic cognitive, emotional, and/ or 
impulse control systems, some or all of which may be present in a given individual at 
any given time. And even specific control systems are themselves difficult to measure. 
There is evidence, for example, that an important component of reality testing 
involves "insight." And while identifiable brain structures are associated with poor 
insight in schizophrenia, 25 insight itself is multidimensional in nature, 26 and different 
types of insight reflect different neurobiological mechanisms. 27 
Notes 
1 In the United States, the term is Assisted Outpatient Treatment (AOT). See www.treatmen-
tadvocacycenter.org/ solution/ assisted-outpatient-treatment-laws. 
2 In some parts of the United States, danger to property, grave disability, and disorganized 
behavior also qualify. 
3 We do not mean to limit the discussion to the United States or constitutional democracies. 
The UK, for example, is a parliamentary democracy, but it equally respects and protects the 
same due process rights. So by constitutional rights, we should be understood to mean due 
process rights generally. 
4 Letter of the President of the Federal Convention, Dated September 17, 1787, to the 
"President of Congress, Transmitting the Constitution." See http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 
18th_century /translet.asp#1. 
5 See generally Kevin Bennardo, "Incarceration's Incapacitative Shortcomings," Santa Clara 
Law Review 54.1: 1-18 (2014). 
6 See Varholy v. Sweat, 153 Fla. 571, 576 (1943) ("The constitutional guarantees of life, 
liberty and property, of which a person cannot be deprived without due process oflaw, do 
not limit the exercise of the police power of the State to preserve the public health so long 
as that power is reasonably and fairly exercised and not abused .... Not only must every 
reasonable presumption be indulged in favor of the validity of legislative action in this 
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